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2025 Cryptocurrency Memes News Released
The Crypto Market of 2025 officially closed, and it was a year full of thrilling events. Whether it was the U.S. President launching a coin or the epic-level mega liquidation, 2025 was destined to be extraordinary. Looking back, we have picked up those absurd and meme-worthy moments of the year, treating them as Easter eggs marking the end of a certain era. Let's see them as a commemoration of you and me still "alive" at the end of the year in this "casino," this amusement park, this experimental ground, hoping to see through to the end. That was the origin of all the memes and absurdity this year, even more absurd than "hot weather turning a cold wallet into a hot wallet."
Founder Goes Missing on TGE Day, Claims Main Coin Multi-Sig Lost in Northern Myanmar
In February, the DIN team announced that they had been unable to reach project founder Harold for several hours and were seeking assistance from VC firms and the media to confirm his whereabouts. According to Harold's previous social media posts, he was suspected to be in Myanmar and claimed to have lost a multi-signature wallet and a laptop. Despite the temporary disappearance of the founder, the DIN team stated that the $DIN token issuance plan was not affected. Currently, 2/3 multi-signature approval has been obtained for the TGE, and it is expected to launch as scheduled. Some community members believe that this incident unexpectedly brought heat to the project, while others questioned the scenario of "founder gone missing, wallet lost, but the project launching as planned," suspecting the possibility of deliberate hype.
zk-Lend Hacker Accidentally Clicks Phishing Site, Leading to Second Theft of Stolen Funds, Hacker Requests Cooperation with zk-Lend to Recover Funds
In April, the zk-Lend hacker (originally in February) mistakenly clicked on a phishing site while attempting to use Tornado Cash, resulting in the theft of 2930 ETH of stolen funds. The hacker then sent an on-chain message to zk-Lend stating, "Hello, I intended to transfer funds to Tornado Cash, but mistakenly used a phishing site, and as a result, all funds were lost. I am devastated. I deeply apologize for the chaos and loss caused by this. All 2930 ETH has been taken by the operators of that website. I have no coins left. Please focus your efforts on those website operators to see if some funds can be recovered."
On the same day, zkLend officially announced that the phishing site seemed to have been operational for over 5 years. At this stage, the security team did not have definitive evidence linking the phishing site to the attacker. As a precautionary measure, zkLend has included these new wallet addresses from the phishing site in its fund-tracking efforts for real-time monitoring and has been in contact with CEX and authorities. The team will continue to work on tracing these funds.
Zerebro Founder Fakes Death and Releases Timed Obituary
In May, a video clip of Zerebro co-founder Jeffy Yu livestreaming his own staged suicide by gunshot circulated online. At the time, many viewed it as another spectacle similar to the earlier Pump.Fun bizarre livestream, just another "drama" staged by a meme developer for attention. On the afternoon of May 6, a screenshot of Jeffy Yu's obituary began circulating on social media, connecting the dots for many who had seen the "suicide clip" two days prior.
As attention intensified, the associated meme token LLJEFFY saw a skyrocket in market value, briefly exceeding $30 million. However, on the evening of the 6th, several Key Opinion Leaders (KOLs) posted revelations debunking the incident. Jeffy Yu had sent a detailed letter to an early investor, revealing that this was a carefully orchestrated "pseudocide exit" plan. Jeffy Yu stated that due to ongoing harassment from a former partner, malicious doxxing, and online hate, he chose to "permanently exit" through the staged death video. He acknowledged in the letter that this was the "only way out" to prevent a sharp drop in the project's token price. This event is considered the first instance of a "pseudocide exit strategy" in cryptocurrency history.
Formerly Embezzled Project Funds, Clanker Partner Unmasked at Offline Event
In May, the AI token launchpad on Base, Clanker, announced the termination of its partnership with core developer proxystudio (@proxystudio.eth). Team member Jack Dishman stated in the announcement that the Clanker team had only recently become aware of proxystudio's past misconduct.
What added a touch of absurdity to this news was the protagonist's multiple identities; proxystudio's actual identity is Gabagool.eth, a figure notorious in the early DeFi community for his online sleuthing skills. In 2022, this online detective was exposed for taking advantage of his position to siphon around $350,000 from his team Velodrome's wallet, only to return the funds under community and project pressure.
Making the situation even more surreal, Gabagool was not uncovered through online data analysis but was identified in person by a former colleague at the FarCon offline event. According to multiple media sources, Aerodrome founder Alex Cutler recognized proxystudio as the former Gabagool at the event, leading to the resurfacing of this old case overnight and Clanker team promptly issuing a statement announcing their separation.
A Bitcoin Wallet Zeroes Out User Balances
In June, several community users reported that their Bitcoin Lightning Network wallet, Alby, appeared to have deducted their balances. The Alby official documentation stated in the updated March 2025 terms of service: "Users have been notified for over a year to withdraw excess funds from their old version Alby accounts created in 2023 and earlier, using a shared wallet architecture. In order to more effectively manage these long-term inactive accounts, the right to deduct the entire remaining balance from the account is reserved after 12 consecutive months with no transaction activity (i.e., no completed transactions)."
Alby, redefining wallets.
Paxos Accidentally Mints 300 Trillion PYUSD and Emergency Destroys It, Equivalent to Over Twice the Global Debt
In October, stablecoin issuer Paxos minted 300 trillion PYUSD stablecoins pegged 1:1 to the US dollar, and after discovering the error, spent 22 minutes destroying all tokens.
Based on its US dollar pegged value, the total amount of destroyed tokens reached around 300 trillion dollars. As a comparison, according to International Monetary Fund data, this amount exceeds more than twice the total GDP of all countries in the world.
Blockchain can solve the global debt problem in just one minute.
A Painter Who Doesn't Draw Candlestick Charts Isn't a Good Market Maker
When you rub quant against the ground, and the market maker of a shitcoin can draw lines freely, the candlestick chart you see be like:
Eclipse: We Have No Users
The Eclipse project has experienced several events that have attracted community attention since its inception, whether it's the founder being involved in a sexual misconduct scandal or multiple mid-project leadership and CEO changes. Not long ago, Eclipse even posted on social media stating that Eclipse was a 36-month sociology research project conducted by Harvard University. "Our research is now complete. Thank you for your time and cooperation." Just when you thought it was over, under a post introducing the new project ETHGAS, the Eclipse official account bluntly stated, we have no users.
Trump's Wife Coin
Everyone stand up.
No language can describe Trump's wife creating her own namesake token MELANIA in the dead of night after her husband launched his own coin. This act was the epitome of absurdity. If the cryptocurrency industry had a pillory, MELANIA would be at the very top, the pinnacle of shame upon shame.
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After the blockade of the Strait of Hormuz, when will the war end?
Before using Musk's "Western WeChat" X Chat, you need to understand these three questions
The X Chat will be available for download on the App Store this Friday. The media has already covered the feature list, including self-destructing messages, screenshot prevention, 481-person group chats, Grok integration, and registration without a phone number, positioning it as the "Western WeChat." However, there are three questions that have hardly been addressed in any reports.
There is a sentence on X's official help page that is still hanging there: "If malicious insiders or X itself cause encrypted conversations to be exposed through legal processes, both the sender and receiver will be completely unaware."
No. The difference lies in where the keys are stored.
In Signal's end-to-end encryption, the keys never leave your device. X, the court, or any external party does not hold your keys. Signal's servers have nothing to decrypt your messages; even if they were subpoenaed, they could only provide registration timestamps and last connection times, as evidenced by past subpoena records.
X Chat uses the Juicebox protocol. This solution divides the key into three parts, each stored on three servers operated by X. When recovering the key with a PIN code, the system retrieves these three shards from X's servers and recombines them. No matter how complex the PIN code is, X is the actual custodian of the key, not the user.
This is the technical background of the "help page sentence": because the key is on X's servers, X has the ability to respond to legal processes without the user's knowledge. Signal does not have this capability, not because of policy, but because it simply does not have the key.
The following illustration compares the security mechanisms of Signal, WhatsApp, Telegram, and X Chat along six dimensions. X Chat is the only one of the four where the platform holds the key and the only one without Forward Secrecy.
The significance of Forward Secrecy is that even if a key is compromised at a certain point in time, historical messages cannot be decrypted because each message has a unique key. Signal's Double Ratchet protocol automatically updates the key after each message, a mechanism lacking in X Chat.
After analyzing the X Chat architecture in June 2025, Johns Hopkins University cryptology professor Matthew Green commented, "If we judge XChat as an end-to-end encryption scheme, this seems like a pretty game-over type of vulnerability." He later added, "I would not trust this any more than I trust current unencrypted DMs."
From a September 2025 TechCrunch report to being live in April 2026, this architecture saw no changes.
In a February 9, 2026 tweet, Musk pledged to undergo rigorous security tests of X Chat before its launch on X Chat and to open source all the code.
As of the April 17 launch date, no independent third-party audit has been completed, there is no official code repository on GitHub, the App Store's privacy label reveals X Chat collects five or more categories of data including location, contact info, and search history, directly contradicting the marketing claim of "No Ads, No Trackers."
Not continuous monitoring, but a clear access point.
For every message on X Chat, users can long-press and select "Ask Grok." When this button is clicked, the message is delivered to Grok in plaintext, transitioning from encrypted to unencrypted at this stage.
This design is not a vulnerability but a feature. However, X Chat's privacy policy does not state whether this plaintext data will be used for Grok's model training or if Grok will store this conversation content. By actively clicking "Ask Grok," users are voluntarily removing the encryption protection of that message.
There is also a structural issue: How quickly will this button shift from an "optional feature" to a "default habit"? The higher the quality of Grok's replies, the more frequently users will rely on it, leading to an increase in the proportion of messages flowing out of encryption protection. The actual encryption strength of X Chat, in the long run, depends not only on the design of the Juicebox protocol but also on the frequency of user clicks on "Ask Grok."
X Chat's initial release only supports iOS, with the Android version simply stating "coming soon" without a timeline.
In the global smartphone market, Android holds about 73%, while iOS holds about 27% (IDC/Statista, 2025). Of WhatsApp's 3.14 billion monthly active users, 73% are on Android (according to Demand Sage). In India, WhatsApp covers 854 million users, with over 95% Android penetration. In Brazil, there are 148 million users, with 81% on Android, and in Indonesia, there are 112 million users, with 87% on Android.
WhatsApp's dominance in the global communication market is built on Android. Signal, with a monthly active user base of around 85 million, also relies mainly on privacy-conscious users in Android-dominant countries.
X Chat circumvented this battlefield, with two possible interpretations. One is technical debt; X Chat is built with Rust, and achieving cross-platform support is not easy, so prioritizing iOS may be an engineering constraint. The other is a strategic choice; with iOS holding a market share of nearly 55% in the U.S., X's core user base being in the U.S., prioritizing iOS means focusing on their core user base rather than engaging in direct competition with Android-dominated emerging markets and WhatsApp.
These two interpretations are not mutually exclusive, leading to the same result: X Chat's debut saw it willingly forfeit 73% of the global smartphone user base.
This matter has been described by some: X Chat, along with X Money and Grok, forms a trifecta creating a closed-loop data system parallel to the existing infrastructure, similar in concept to the WeChat ecosystem. This assessment is not new, but with X Chat's launch, it's worth revisiting the schematic.
X Chat generates communication metadata, including information on who is talking to whom, for how long, and how frequently. This data flows into X's identity system. Part of the message content goes through the Ask Grok feature and enters Grok's processing chain. Financial transactions are handled by X Money: external public testing was completed in March, opening to the public in April, enabling fiat peer-to-peer transfers via Visa Direct. A senior Fireblocks executive confirmed plans for cryptocurrency payments to go live by the end of the year, holding money transmitter licenses in over 40 U.S. states currently.
Every WeChat feature operates within China's regulatory framework. Musk's system operates within Western regulatory frameworks, but he also serves as the head of the Department of Government Efficiency (DOGE). This is not a WeChat replica; it is a reenactment of the same logic under different political conditions.
The difference is that WeChat has never explicitly claimed to be "end-to-end encrypted" on its main interface, whereas X Chat does. "End-to-end encryption" in user perception means that no one, not even the platform, can see your messages. X Chat's architectural design does not meet this user expectation, but it uses this term.
X Chat consolidates the three data lines of "who this person is, who they are talking to, and where their money comes from and goes to" in one company's hands.
The help page sentence has never been just technical instructions.
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1 billion DOTs were minted out of thin air, but the hacker only made 230,000 dollars
After the blockade of the Strait of Hormuz, when will the war end?
Before using Musk's "Western WeChat" X Chat, you need to understand these three questions
The X Chat will be available for download on the App Store this Friday. The media has already covered the feature list, including self-destructing messages, screenshot prevention, 481-person group chats, Grok integration, and registration without a phone number, positioning it as the "Western WeChat." However, there are three questions that have hardly been addressed in any reports.
There is a sentence on X's official help page that is still hanging there: "If malicious insiders or X itself cause encrypted conversations to be exposed through legal processes, both the sender and receiver will be completely unaware."
No. The difference lies in where the keys are stored.
In Signal's end-to-end encryption, the keys never leave your device. X, the court, or any external party does not hold your keys. Signal's servers have nothing to decrypt your messages; even if they were subpoenaed, they could only provide registration timestamps and last connection times, as evidenced by past subpoena records.
X Chat uses the Juicebox protocol. This solution divides the key into three parts, each stored on three servers operated by X. When recovering the key with a PIN code, the system retrieves these three shards from X's servers and recombines them. No matter how complex the PIN code is, X is the actual custodian of the key, not the user.
This is the technical background of the "help page sentence": because the key is on X's servers, X has the ability to respond to legal processes without the user's knowledge. Signal does not have this capability, not because of policy, but because it simply does not have the key.
The following illustration compares the security mechanisms of Signal, WhatsApp, Telegram, and X Chat along six dimensions. X Chat is the only one of the four where the platform holds the key and the only one without Forward Secrecy.
The significance of Forward Secrecy is that even if a key is compromised at a certain point in time, historical messages cannot be decrypted because each message has a unique key. Signal's Double Ratchet protocol automatically updates the key after each message, a mechanism lacking in X Chat.
After analyzing the X Chat architecture in June 2025, Johns Hopkins University cryptology professor Matthew Green commented, "If we judge XChat as an end-to-end encryption scheme, this seems like a pretty game-over type of vulnerability." He later added, "I would not trust this any more than I trust current unencrypted DMs."
From a September 2025 TechCrunch report to being live in April 2026, this architecture saw no changes.
In a February 9, 2026 tweet, Musk pledged to undergo rigorous security tests of X Chat before its launch on X Chat and to open source all the code.
As of the April 17 launch date, no independent third-party audit has been completed, there is no official code repository on GitHub, the App Store's privacy label reveals X Chat collects five or more categories of data including location, contact info, and search history, directly contradicting the marketing claim of "No Ads, No Trackers."
Not continuous monitoring, but a clear access point.
For every message on X Chat, users can long-press and select "Ask Grok." When this button is clicked, the message is delivered to Grok in plaintext, transitioning from encrypted to unencrypted at this stage.
This design is not a vulnerability but a feature. However, X Chat's privacy policy does not state whether this plaintext data will be used for Grok's model training or if Grok will store this conversation content. By actively clicking "Ask Grok," users are voluntarily removing the encryption protection of that message.
There is also a structural issue: How quickly will this button shift from an "optional feature" to a "default habit"? The higher the quality of Grok's replies, the more frequently users will rely on it, leading to an increase in the proportion of messages flowing out of encryption protection. The actual encryption strength of X Chat, in the long run, depends not only on the design of the Juicebox protocol but also on the frequency of user clicks on "Ask Grok."
X Chat's initial release only supports iOS, with the Android version simply stating "coming soon" without a timeline.
In the global smartphone market, Android holds about 73%, while iOS holds about 27% (IDC/Statista, 2025). Of WhatsApp's 3.14 billion monthly active users, 73% are on Android (according to Demand Sage). In India, WhatsApp covers 854 million users, with over 95% Android penetration. In Brazil, there are 148 million users, with 81% on Android, and in Indonesia, there are 112 million users, with 87% on Android.
WhatsApp's dominance in the global communication market is built on Android. Signal, with a monthly active user base of around 85 million, also relies mainly on privacy-conscious users in Android-dominant countries.
X Chat circumvented this battlefield, with two possible interpretations. One is technical debt; X Chat is built with Rust, and achieving cross-platform support is not easy, so prioritizing iOS may be an engineering constraint. The other is a strategic choice; with iOS holding a market share of nearly 55% in the U.S., X's core user base being in the U.S., prioritizing iOS means focusing on their core user base rather than engaging in direct competition with Android-dominated emerging markets and WhatsApp.
These two interpretations are not mutually exclusive, leading to the same result: X Chat's debut saw it willingly forfeit 73% of the global smartphone user base.
This matter has been described by some: X Chat, along with X Money and Grok, forms a trifecta creating a closed-loop data system parallel to the existing infrastructure, similar in concept to the WeChat ecosystem. This assessment is not new, but with X Chat's launch, it's worth revisiting the schematic.
X Chat generates communication metadata, including information on who is talking to whom, for how long, and how frequently. This data flows into X's identity system. Part of the message content goes through the Ask Grok feature and enters Grok's processing chain. Financial transactions are handled by X Money: external public testing was completed in March, opening to the public in April, enabling fiat peer-to-peer transfers via Visa Direct. A senior Fireblocks executive confirmed plans for cryptocurrency payments to go live by the end of the year, holding money transmitter licenses in over 40 U.S. states currently.
Every WeChat feature operates within China's regulatory framework. Musk's system operates within Western regulatory frameworks, but he also serves as the head of the Department of Government Efficiency (DOGE). This is not a WeChat replica; it is a reenactment of the same logic under different political conditions.
The difference is that WeChat has never explicitly claimed to be "end-to-end encrypted" on its main interface, whereas X Chat does. "End-to-end encryption" in user perception means that no one, not even the platform, can see your messages. X Chat's architectural design does not meet this user expectation, but it uses this term.
X Chat consolidates the three data lines of "who this person is, who they are talking to, and where their money comes from and goes to" in one company's hands.
The help page sentence has never been just technical instructions.
App